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Japan–North Korea relations have not been formally established, but there have been diplomatic talks between the two governments to discuss the issue of kidnapped Japanese citizens and North Korea's nuclear program. Relations between the two countries are severely strained and marked by tension and hostility. According to a 2014 BBC World Service, 91% of Japanese people view North Korea's influence negatively, with just 1% expressing a positive view; the most negative perception of North Korea in the world. 〔(2014 World Service Poll ) ''BBC''〕 ==History== In the first years after the proclamation of the North Korean state, relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo were mostly hostile and practically non-existent. In 1949-1950, the North Korean leadership vehemently condemned the economic and political negotiations between Japan and the administration of Syngman Rhee.〔Bruce Cumings, ''The Origins of the Korean War II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950'' (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 458-459.〕 Later, however, North Korea sought to take advantage of the conflict that erupted between Japan and South Korea over the Syngman Rhee Line. In response to the initiative of Japanese Prime Minister Ichirō Hatoyama, who sought to achieve rapprochement with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, in February 1955 North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il issued a statement calling for economic and cultural cooperation with Japan. From 1955 to 1964, Japanese-North Korean economic relations underwent gradual expansion, partly because Pyongyang sought to prevent a Japanese-South Korean rapprochement by adopting a cooperative attitude toward Tokyo, and partly because North Korea tried to reduce its economic dependence on the Soviet Union.〔Kiwon Chung, Japanese-North Korean Relations Today, ''Asian Survey'', Vol. 4, Issue 4 (April 1964), pp. 788-803.〕 In 1955, North Korea assisted in establishing the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, Chongryon in Korean, which serves as an advocacy organization for ethnic Koreans in Japan who identify with the DPRK and acts as the de facto North Korean embassy in Japan. Voluntary repatriation of Korean residents from Japan to North Korea progressed slowly but smoothly after the conclusion of the Red Cross agreement of 1959. By late 1960, almost 50,000 of the estimated 600,000 Korean residents had arrived in North Korea aboard chartered Soviet ships. The repatriation program was extended for another year in October 1960 to accommodate the estimated 60,000 still wishing repatriation. In 1965, the North Korean government sharply criticized the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Under Premier Eisaku Satō, Japanese-North Korean relations underwent a deterioration, but in 1971-1972, the process of Sino-Japanese rapprochement induced Japanese companies to broaden their economic cooperation with the DPRK. Under Premier Kakuei Tanaka, the Japanese government adopted a policy of equidistance toward North Korea and South Korea, and refused to take sides with Seoul against Pyongyang during the Mun Se-gwang affair. Nevertheless, it still refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea. Under Takeo Miki and his successors, Japan switched back to a policy that clearly favored the ROK over the DPRK. The North Korean leadership felt increasingly isolated when Takeo Fukuda concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, and Yasuhiro Nakasone visited South Korea in 1983. In periods of Japanese-ROK cooperation and Japanese-DPRK friction, Pyongyang often expressed its dissatisfaction by raising the issue of the Liancourt Rocks dispute.〔 Balázs Szalontai, "Instrumental Nationalism? The Dokdo Problem Through the Lens of North Korean Propaganda and Diplomacy," ''Journal of Northeast Asian History'', Vol. 10, Issue 2 (Winter 2013), pp. 128-139. On Japan's attitude toward the Mun Segwang affair, see Victor D. Cha, ''Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle'' (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 124-130.〕 Until the late 1980s, North Korea's policy toward Japan was mainly aimed at minimizing cooperation between South Korea and Japan, and at deterring Japan's rearmament while striving for closer diplomatic and commercial ties with Japan. Crucial to this policy was the fostering within Japan of support for North Korea, especially among the Japanese who supported the Japanese communist and socialist parties and the Korean residents of Japan. Over the years, however, North Korea did much to discredit itself in the eyes of many potential supporters in Japan. Japanese who had accompanied their spouses to North Korea had endured severe hardships and were prevented from communicating with relatives and friends in Japan. Japan watched with disdain as North Korea gave safe haven to elements of the Japanese Red Army, which Japan designates as a terrorist group. North Korea's inability or refusal to pay its debts to Japanese traders also reinforced popular Japanese disdain for North Korea. Japan–North Korea relations turned more antagonistic in the late 1980s. The two governments did not maintain diplomatic relations and had no substantive contacts. The opposition Japan Socialist Party nonetheless had cordial relations with the North Korean regime. Japan allowed trade with North Korea only through unofficial channels, reportedly exceeding US$200 million annually in the 1980s. Issues in Japan-North relations that produced tensions included North Korean media attacks on Japan, Japan's imposition of economic sanctions on North Korea for terrorist acts against South Korea in the 1980s, and unpaid North Korean debts to Japanese enterprises of about $50 million. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Japan–North Korea relations」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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